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if we can, how Congress and the courts, 
md the Board itself, can better review 
und control its operations. 
In the area of labor law, and as re-
spects the Board's role in it, every man 
may be a partisan. But I hope that these 
hearings will be received in the same 
impartial spirit in which they will be 
conducted. This is an opportunity to 
criticize honestly where criticism is war-
ranted, and to praise where praise is de-
served. Our objective is to do what we 
can to improve the operations of the 
NLRB, administrative agencies in gen-
eral, and the Government as a whole. 
We shall rely upon witnesses not only to 
analyze the role of the Board in terms 
of the poiicit's established by Congress, 
but also to suggest practical methods by 
which congressional and judicial over-
sight of this administrative agency and 
the others can be improved. 
The subcommittee has invited a num-
ber of scholars and other experts in 
administrative law and labor relations to 
testify at the hearings. In addition, we 
shall hear from representatives of man-
agement, labor, and the Board itself. 
Among those who are presently sched-
uled to testify or present statements are 
Profs. Derek Bok and Louis Jaffe of the 
Harvard Law School, Prof. Archibald 
Cox of the Harvard Law School and 
fonnerly Solicitor General of the United 
States, Prof. Howard Lesnick of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, Pwf. Harry H. 
Wellington of Yale Law School, and Prof. 
Cornelius •J. Peck of the University of 
Washington, Seattle. 
Because of the widespread interest in 
these hearings it may not be possible 
to bear every person who wishes to test-
ify. However, the subcommittee will 
make every effort to accommodate those 
who wish to submit statements for the 
record. All persons desiring to present 
testimony or submit written statements 
should contact the subcommittee office, 
room 1403, New Senate Office Building. 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON PROPOSED 
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1968 
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, I want 
to give notice that open public hearings 
on the proposed new Internal Security 
Act of 1968-S. 2988-will begin at 10:30 
a.m. on February 27, and will continue 
through a period of several weeks there-
after. Any person wishing to testify on 
this bill should communicate with the 
clerk on the Committee on the Judiciary, 
Mr. John Holloman, or the chief counsel 
of the Internal Security Subcommittee, 
Mr. Jay Sourwine. Anyone wishing to 
present a prepared statement should sub-
mit a copy of the statement to the sub-
committee at least 24 hours before the 
date scheduled for his appearance. 
Written statements for inclusion in the 
record, but not intended to be presented 
orally, may be submitted at any time 
during the course of the hearings, and 
will be admitted to the hearing record if 
found pertinent and not excessive in 
length. 
The hearing on Tuesday, February 27, 
will be held In room 3304 in the New 
Senate Office Building. 
ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED 
The Secretary of the Senate. reported 
that on today, February 26, 1968, he 
presented to the President Qf the United 
States the enrolled bill (~ 269) to au-
thorize an exchange of lands at Acadia 
National Park, Maine. 
ORD~R OF BUSINESS 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if no 
one wishes to speak at this moment, I 
should like to speak for about 5 minutes 
if I may. 
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator 
from Montana is recognized, although 
the Chair has a request from the Senator 
from Alaska. 
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, may we ha~e order in the Cham-
ber? 
The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the Sen-
ator from Montana withhold for just one 
moment. The Chair must insist that the 
Chamber be in order and that the gal-
leries be quiet. The Senator from Mon-
tana seeks recognition. 
The Senator from Montana. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask 
for several additional minutes. 
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jectiDn, it is so ord£red. 
VIETNAM 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last 
week, U Thant, the Secretary General 
of the United Nations, met for an hour 
with President Johnson at the White 
House. It is safe to assume that the sub-
ject matter discussed was the possibility 
of negotiations covering a cessation of 
hostilities or an epding of the war in 
Vietnam. What came aut of tqat meeting 
in the way of concensus or agreement, 
I do not know but, again, I think it is 
safe to assume that both men expressed 
. a desire for peace and covered, in their 
discussion, various ways, means, and 
possibilities for achieving it. 
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi-
dent, the Senate still is not in order. 
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's 
position is well taken. The Senator from 
Montana will suspend. The Chair must 
ask the doorkeepers to see that order is 
maintained in the galleries when the 
Senate is in session. 
The Senate will please be in order. 
The Senator from Montana may pro-
ceed. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, over 
the weekend, U Thant held a press con-
ference in which he stated what seems 
to me to be the reasonable belief that 
talks could begin shortly after the United 
States calls off the bombing of North 
Vietnam. 
Over the weekend also, there have 
been, more and more, speculative stories 
coming out of Saigon, Bangkok, and 
Washington to the effect that the Presi-
dent would soon ask for an increase of 
anywhere up to 100,000 men in Viet-
nam. It is anticipated-again, accor<Ung 
to speculation-that when Gen. Earl 
Wheeler, Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, returns to Washington this 
week, he will make a. recommendation 
that our forces be increased in Vietnam 
beyond the present ceiling of 525,000 
men by July 1. 
Therefore, it appears to me that this 
country may be facing, on the one hand, 
a pressure to increase. its commitment of 
military personnel in Vietnam again 
and perhaps again, and again; and, on 
the other, the need to make further and 
more intensive efforts to reach the ne-
gotiating table on the basis of views such 
as those advanced by U Thant. It 1s my 
hope that more attention would be given 
to what U Thant has proposed than 
seems to have been the case up to this 
time. His views are entitled to the most 
deliberate consideration not so much be-
cause of the immediate situation in Viet-
nam, but because of the difficulties and 
dilemmas which have been present since 
the very beginning of the confiict. 
Even though it appears to pre~~ent mili-
tary questions, I believe that U Thant's 
proposal to halt the bombing of North 
Vietnam can be given consideration for a. 
number of reasons: First, there are very · 
few significant targets left in North 
Vietnam; second, the bombing has not 
halted the infiltration of men and sup-
plies in South Vietnam; and third, the 
bombing has failed to bring Hanoi to the 
conference table. 
A halt to the bombing of the North 
would not, and should not weaken the 
air support of the U.S. forces along the 
17th parallel and most particularly at 
Khe Sanh. These ground forces, without 
question, must continue to have all pos-
sible air support not only along the 17th 
parallel in Vietnam itself but across the 
infiltration routes which extend through 
Laos. Wherever else in is needed in con-
junction with ground-force operations, 
air support must be forthcoming. 
It is my belief, however, that U Thant's 
suggestion makes sense because a way 
around the impasse which confronts us 
in Vietnam will not be found by milltar,y 
means but will have to be brought about 
through negotiations. If on the one hand 
the Soviet Union and China a.re to con-
tinue ad infinitum to supply North Viet-
nam with the most sophisticated weap-
ons and other forms of assistance, and 
if we are to continue the same policy in 
relation to South Vietnam, then I think 
there lies ahead, not only for this, country 
but also for the rest of the world, far 
more troublous days than ha.s been the 
case to date. 
Therefore, I would hope, Mr. Presi-
dent, that, instead of an obsessive pur-
suit of a solution by a continual escala-
tion of manpower commitments, we 
would think about escalating our peace 
efforts in an effort to find an honorable 
settlement-irrespective of considera-
tions of face. 
No one can say that to halt the bomb-
ing of the north, as U Thant has pro-
posed, will bring about fruitful negotia-
tions, but it is a proposal worth trying 
as a step toward peace. Indeed, it may 
well have more merit than going an-
other rung of military escalation in the 
hope that it will end the bloodshed, es-
pecially since every previous step-up has 
produced, not peace, but simply a more 
open ended. more destructive, and more 
dev11Stating war. 
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I refer once again, too, to the pro-
posal made by our distinguished col-
league, the. Senator from Kentucky [Mr. 
CooPER] that we confine the bombing to 
the 17th parallel and to the Ho Chi Minh 
trails in L'los and that we concentrate 
and consolidate our effort and forces 
within South Vietnam. Finally,' I would 
refer, once again, to the unanimous reso-
lution of the Senate which calls for an 
open initiative in the United Nations 
Security Council in an effort to delineate 
a path toward peace-an initiative which 
has yet to be taken. These suggestions 
interrelate with the suggestion of 
U Thant which, I repeat, is deserving of 
our most careful and immediate con-
sideration. 
In one way or another, it seems to me, 
that it is preferable to make a try for 
negotiations than to continue to heed 
the insatiable calls for more and more 
men as the war spreads and intensifies. 
To make this try, to me, is preferable to 
going back to the past to find out how 
we got into this barbarous war. To me, 
it is preferable to concentrate on today 
and to plan for tomolTOW in an effort to 
find an honorable conclusion to the war 
in Vietnam before it gets completely out 
of hand. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the 
text of U Thant's statement, published 
in the New York Times on yesterday. 
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the 
Rxcoao, as follows: 
'IUT OP THANT'S STATEMENT ON TALKS ABOUT 
VIETNAM 
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., February 24.-Varl· 
ous questions have been raised, and different 
interpretations have been given, following 
my recent talks In certain capitals. Indeed, 
It Is !or me a great advantage In the dis· 
charge or my respon.;lbllltles as Secretary 
General o! the United Nations to be able to 
meet at Intervals with leaders o! governments 
and to exchange views with them. 
Obviously, In the present circumstances, 
the war In VIetnam has taken precedence 
over all other subjects In the discussions, 
simply as a result o! the increasing concern 
that thls war causes the world ove~. 
Although It Is !or the parties directly in-
volved, ultimately-and, I hope, soon-to 
take the steps and establish the contacts 
necessary for negot.latlons, which they know 
must take place I! this war Is ever to be 
brought to an end The Vietnam conflict has 
repercussions which extend far beyond the 
parties themselves. That is why I !eel It 
would be useful to present this account ot 
what happened during these recent meetings. 
TRAVEL DETAILS GIVEN 
Some or the details or my travel have al-
ready been made public on a day-to-day 
basis by the Vnlted Nations headquarters. 
Nevertheless, as I feel It relevo.nt to what I 
wlsh to state today, I will record them again 
in the order In which they took place. 
As Is known, I took the opportunity dur-
Ing a brief visit to New Delhi In connection 
with the second session of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development to 
meet the .Consul General o! the Democratic 
Republic of VleLnam [North VIetnam], Mr. 
Nguyen Hoa, on Feb. 8, and to discuss with 
him the question or VIetnam. 
The consul general affirmed that his gov-
ernment "would bold talks with Washing-
ton on all relevant matters nt an appropriate 
time after the unconditional cessation of 
bombing and o! all other acts of war against 
the Democratic Republic of VIetnam." 
He drew my attention to the statement 
that had been made on this subject the day 
before [Feb. 7] by the Foreign Minister of the 
Democratic Republlc of VIetnam In an In• 
tervlew with a press agency, which said, In 
particular, that talks wlll begin as soon as 
the United States has proved that It has 
really unconditionally stopped the bombing. 
I then put to him some questions which he 
promised to transmit to his Government, as-
suring me that It would reply to these ques-
tions as soon as possible. 
FLEW ON TO MOSCOW 
Wh!le In New Delhi, I called on the Presi-
dent of India, Dr. Zalctl' Husain, and bad 
several meetings with the Prime Minister of 
India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. 
From there I Hew to Moscow where I was 
received by the secretary general or the Com-
munist party, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev; the 
chairman of the counc!l of ministers, Pre-
mier Aleksel Kosygln, President Nikolai V. 
Podgorny and Foreign Minister Andrei A. 
Gromyko. 
In London, I was received by Prime Min-
Ister Harold Wilson and had dlscW!Sions with 
him, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Com-
monwealth Secretary George Thomson; the 
Minister o! State, Lord Chalfont, and the 
leader of the Opposition, Mr. Edward Heath. 
Wb!le in London, on Feb. 13, I was In-
formed tbo.t the delegate general o! the Dem-
ocratic Republic o! VIetnam In France, Mr. 
Mal Van Bo, bad just received a message 
from his Government !or transmits! to me. 
This was the reply to the questions I had 
submitted In New Delhi. I left !or Paris on 
the 14th and saw Mr Mal Van Bo, who con-
veyed to me the reply from his Government, 
dated Feb. 13, to my questions. 
In this message, there was a further clari-
fication of Hanoi's position concerning dls-
cUBSlons with Washington. I was told that 
the Democratic Republic or Vietnam would 
hold talks with the United States at the ap-
propriate time, that is, as soon as the uncon-
ditional cessation of bombing and or all other 
acts of war against the Democratic Republic 
or VIetnam became effective. 
ANY TOPIC ADMISSIBLE 
I was further informed that, at the talks, 
the United States could bring up any mat-
ters for discussion In the same way as the 
Democratic Republic of VIetnam could 
bring up any other. In reply to my query, 
Mr. Mal Van Bo stated that the question or 
the reduction In the fighting In South VIet-
nam, the question or the reconvening of the 
Geneva Conference and any other question 
could be brought up nt the talks. 
On the same day, I was received by Presi-
dent Charles de Gaulle and Foreign Min-
Ister Maurice Couve de Murville. Upon my 
return to New York Feb 15, I Informed Am -
bo.ssador Arthur Goldberg of the substance 
ot my discussions on VIetnam during my 
visit to various countries. On Feb. 16, I con-
ferred with the permanent observer of the 
Republlc or VIetnam ( SouLh VIetnam J, Mr. 
Nguyen Huu Chi. 
On Feb. 21, I was received by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary or State 
Dean Rusk In Washington . The President 
reaffirmed his continued desire to achieve a 
peaceful settlement and the continued va-
ll<tJty o! the San An tonio formu la. Both the 
President and the Secretary o! State stressed 
the no-military-advantage provision ot that 
formula. 
CONVICTION REINFORCED 
My talks In various capitals have rein-
forced my convlcLion, which I have repeo.t-
edly expressed In my public statements on 
the Issue of VIetnam for the past three 
years, namely, that the question Is essentially 
a political problem which cannot be solved 
through the application o! military force. 
In the light or my talks, I reaffirm all that 
I have said In the past concerning my assess-
ment of the VIetnam problem and my ap-
preach to it. If the Vietnam question Is seen 
as a contest ot unyielding will, there can be 
no solution. 
In the broader context It appears. lndee<! •. 
that both the United States and the Soviet 
Union are firmly determined to prevent the 
defeat of the side which each supports If 
such a trend continues, the conclusion Is 
Inescapable that there wtll be continued In-
tensification and escalation of the conflict, 
resulting in unforeseeable developments with 
dire consequences. 
EARLY TALKS EXPECTED 
On the other hand, my recent contacts have 
confirmed my view that, If essential steps are 
taken, they will lead to a chain of events 
which, In the end, can bring about a just 
solution to the problem, and which wlll saye 
both South VIetnam and North VIetnam 
from devastation and virtual destruction and 
will offer a chance for the people of VIetnam 
to regain a sense of national identity and to 
reconstruct their war-torn country. 
Everywhere I found a genuine desire to 
bring this tragic conflict to an end. The In-
creased Intensity of the hostllltlea during the 
past few weeb should not lead to the con-
clusion that tl:.e door Is cl06ed tor negotia-
tions. 
In my view, the Indispensable first step 
ot ending all bombing and other acts of war 
against the Democratic Republic of VIetnam 
should be taken and could be taken without 
too great a. military risk. If such a step were 
to be taken, I am more than ever convinced 
that meaningful talks wtll take place much 
earlier than Is generally supposed, even per-
haps wlthln a matter of a few days. , 
.o\5 tor the questions concerning the coD-
duct of the fighting after the unconditional 
cessation of the bombing, partlclularly in the 
demilitarized zone and acrOM the frontiers, 
It can reasonably be assumed that these will 
be dealt with 1n good faith. The parties them-
selves should solve this problem In order to 
allow for the larger negotiations to take 
place, with the participation o! all parties 
concerned, including the Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam and the National Llb-
ero.tlon Front of South VIetnam. 
ATMOSPHERE POISONED 
The VIetnam war has already poisoned the 
atmosphere and strained International rela-
tions. This strain Is keenly felt In The United 
Nations, whose effective !unctlonlng has been 
Impaired as a result. We are witnessing more 
and more the unfortunate and undesirable 
repercussions ot this war in other parts of the 
world. 
Inasmuch as the United Nations remains 
humanity's maLo hope for peace it is my 
duty, regardless of all criticisms, to try to 
reflect the oon.sensus o! International public 
oplnion and the deep concern whlch has ex-
pressed itsel! through the forum of the Gen-
era.! Aasembly. • 
Indeed, the world Is anguished and sick-
ened by the continued Intensity and savagery 
of the war. It Is heart-rending to witness the 
agony or the Innocent civilians who cannot 
possibly know what it Is a.ll about. Also the 
mllltary casualties steadily mount. The ugli-
ness of the war Is matched only by Its !util-
Ity. There can be no victory, no defeat, only 
more, su.trerlng, more death and more de-
struction. The very survival of Vietnam Is 
at stake. It Is time to call a halt. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the 
Senator from Montana yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. AIKEN. I am glad that the Sen-
ator from Montana, the majority leader, 
has spoken out as he has. I do not know, 
and neither does anyone else here know 
for sure, whether to stop the bombing of 
North Vietnam would bring the war to a 
conclusion in that area. 
But we should know that the addition 
of 100,000 men to our fighting forces in 
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SoutheaSt Asia will not go very far to-
ward bringing any war to a successful 
,;lilitary conclusion. 
I believe it was in the late summer of 
1963 that: we were told that adding 6,000 
or 7,000 men to the forces that were 
then in South Vietnam, bringing that 
total to 17,000, would be adequate to re-
store stability to that country at an early 
date. In fact, it was about that time that 
the Secretary of Defense predicted that 
we would be bringing our forces home by 
Christmas. 
Next thing we knew, we had 35,000 
men there. Then the increase went on 
from there. 
Two years ago we had 160,000 or 170,-
000 men in Vietnam, and we were told 
1f the number were doubled-! think at 
that time General Westmoreland asked 
to have the number doubled, making 
340,000--that would be adequate. Then 
we were told it would take 500,000. Then 
it went up to 525,000. Now it is up to 
probably 625,000. 
In my opinion, the addition of 100,000 
men Is only a drop in the bucket if it is 
t.he determination of the President and 
the administration to bring about a mili-
tary victory in Southeast Asia. One just 
has to rer..d the news items to see how the 
perimeter of the war is expanding. The 
news this morning states that three cities 
in Laos have been taken by the North 
Vietnamese or the Vietcong-! do not 
know which it is--but this is only a start 
in that direction. We owe something to 
the defense of Laos if we do to other 
countries in Southeast Asia, because Laos, 
in fad, has been on our team to the full-
est extent--that is, Souvanna Phouma 
has, anyway, even though he controls 
only about half of that country. So we 
may just as well be prepared. 
As I said on the floor a couple of years 
ago, if we are going to fight an all-owt 
war in Asia, we must adopt those 1ules 
and regulations that go with all-out war. 
That means universal conscription. It 
means a big increase in taxes. It means 
wage and price controls. 
The President is inadvertently respon-
sible for the escalation in prices and 
wages, because every time he asks labor 
not to ask for more money, and every 
time he tells industry not to raise its 
prices, implying we will have wage and 
price controls if they do, it is an open 
invitation to raising wages and raising 
prices in order to get them as high as 
possible before the freeze sets in. .. 
So I hope nobody is going to be fooled 
by the request for 100,000 more men in 
Asia if we have the idea of a complete 
military victory in our miT.\ds. I would 
suggest that, instead of 100,000, perhaps 
another cipher be added to that figure-
and not before the ' '1." • 
Mr. JA VITS. Mr. President, will the 
majority leader yield, on my own time? 
I have 3 minutes. 
I would like to ask one question. First, 
I certainly concur in what my colleagues 
have said. Second, not only is the perim-
eter of the war expanding, but. also its 
Americanization . This deeply concerns 
the American people. It is more and 
more our war, 
I would like to ask the Senator, with 
respect to the cessation of bombings as 
a basis for beginning negotiations , I 
think we "missed the boat" in January 
1967, when the PoiX, joined by U Thant, 
and many others, asked that tbe bomb-
ing be stopped. · 
I would like to ask the Senator, who 
is 1rery knowledgeable in this field, in ad-
ditrion to being majority leader, if he does 
not believe i1 would be a challenge to 
4.merican diplomacy, on which this Gov-
ernment ought to concentrate, to recre-
ate the diplomatic conditions of Febru-
ary 1967. In the postwar world, we have 
seen that it takes the two super powers 
working together to get anything done 
of this nature. If the Sov1et Union joined 
the call for a bombing cessation as a 
basis for beginning negotiations, along 
the lines of our San Antonio formula, 
that would represent a situation in which 
the Soviet Union's prestige is on the line 
just as much as ours. 
It seems to me that this is a key chal-
lenge facing the administration; this is 
the basic idea on which I would like to 
get the opinion of the majority leader. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may I 
say that Mr. Kosygin on a number of oc-
casions has indicated that the step that 
could b1ing about negotiations would be 
a cessation of the bombing of the north. 
Frankly, I would not care what coun-
tries were involved if we could find our 
way to the negotiating table, and so I 
would not be at all averse to encom-
passing all directly and indirectly in-
volved, including the NLF, China, and 
the Soviet Union. After all, two of those 
are signatories to the Geneva accords of 
1954 and 1962. 
I can understand the reticence of the 
administration, but we have had sug-
gestions from the Soviet Union, Poland, 
and the Pope. U Thant has just made a 
trip, at which time he discussed with 
various countries the possibility of 
peace-in New Delhi, in Paris, where he 
talked with Mal Van Bo, Mr. de Gaulle, 
Mr. Couve de Murville. He has come here 
and talked to the President and has indi-
cated-he could very well have been too 
optimistic--that it would bring about ne. 
gotiations within several days. 
I cannot see what is to be lost when we 
may have a choice between having nego-
tiations or the sending of additional tens 
of thousands of our troops to Vietnam. 
Now, it is all speculation so far. No-
body knows if additional troops are going 
to be sent, but all indications are that 
that is being considered, as a result of 
a series of recent events t1iggered by 
North Vietnam, as a result of incidents 
that have taken place in 36 provincial 
capitals and in other cities and hamlets 
as well. 
We have Marines entrenched in Khe 
Sanh. Both sides are ready to jump into 
battle. I do not know whether a battle is 
going to occur in Khe Sanh or not, even 
though all the evidence pofnts to it. I 
would not obviate the possibility, never-
theless, that Giap, or whoever is respon-
sible for the situation in the northwest 
corner of South Vietnam, may be pin-
ning down large numbers of our troops 
in that area for the purpose of carrying 
on activities up and down the peninsula 
and up and down the 38th parallel. 
We have difficulties. We do not know 
how we got into the box of Vietnam. But 
that is a moot question. It is too late to 
decide how we got into it. The important 
question is, how do we get out and how 
do we get out under honorable circum-
stances? 
Mr. AIKEN. If the Senator will yield 
for another moment, I want to reiterate 
that I do not know, and I do not know 
of anyone else who knows, whether a 
cessation of the bombing of North Viet-
nam would result in peace efforts within 
a reasonable time or not; but we should 
know that if the bombing ceases, in view 
of what other count1ies have said, and 
there is no honest move toward peace on 
the part of Russia, China, or Vietnam, 
then we could really expect a change in 
world opinion, which up to now has 
largely held the United States responsi-
ble for the wartime conditions which 
have existed in that part of the world. 
It would at least prove whether the 
Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, and 
their prime supporters, Russia and 
China, really want peace in that area or 
not. We tried, with a resolution, to get 
Russia to stand up and be counted at the 
United Nations, but the administration 
has not seen fit to push the issue. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that the 
sense of the Senate resolution should be· 
used, embarrassment or not, win, lose, or 
draw, because, after all, it did pass this 
body unanimously, and it did express the 
sense of the Senate. The P.resident, I 
know, has attempted to lay the ground-
work for it, but other events have inter-
vened, and up to now, no specific action 
has been taken. But I certainly hope, as 
does the Senator from Vermont and every 
other member of this body, regardless of 
how he is classified, that the members of 
the United Nations will try to do as a 
body what its Secretary General, U 
Thant, has tried to do on his own. I hope 
that those nations which talk peace will 
try to do something to bring it about. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator 
from Montana has 3 minutes. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 3 minutes to 
the Senator from Arkansas. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In view, particular-
ly, of the statement of the Senator from 
Vermont about the necessity of radical 
changes in the way we do our business 
if the administration is going to put 
another 100,000 or perhaps 500,000 men 
in Vietnam, I ask whether the majority 
leader knows or can find out for the 
Senate whether or not the administra-
tion intends to consult Congress and al-
low it at least to discuss the matter, in 
view of the very dubious basis for the so-
called Gulf of Tonkin resolution. 
I wonder whether the administration 
is contemplating a declaration of war, 
upon which would be based the kind of 
regulations which the Senator from Ver-
mont just mentioned. It seems to me, if 
the administration is going now to un-
dertake a vast new ·escalation, Congress 
should at least be consulted and have 
an opportunity to express itself. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, may 
I say that what I have said is based only 
on speculation and rumors; stories which 
have appeared in the press; a trip last 
week by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Wheeler, to Saigon; a 
statement issued from Bangkok yester-
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day that it was thought more men 
would be needed; a statement given in an 
interview by General Westmoreland to 
one of the press associations to the etrect 
that it was thought he would need more 
men. 
I would feel that as far as the Presi-
dent is concerned, he will discuss mat-
ters of this sort. I know he is very anx-
ious to meet with members of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, for example, 
to discuss matters of mutual interest. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I understand 
that the majority leader is saying that 
the President has not discussed with 
him such matters as sending another 
100,000 men to Vietnam, nor has he dis-
cussed with him his plans in this con-
neCtion? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. No, nor do I think 
he is in a position where, at this time, 
he can discuss them, because I assume 
he is waiting for informa.tton, and on 
the basis of the information and the rec-
ommendations which will be made, then 
he will be face to face with a decision. 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If he has not dis-
cusaed it with the ma.jorUy leader, I 
Nothing in the staff report could be re-
motely considered as endangering the se-
curity of the United States, especially 3% 
years after the events. Surely the North 
Vietnamese know by now what hap-
pened-even if it has been withheld from 
the Ame1ican people. 
The American people, who are paying 
the cost in lives, blood, and money, have 
a. right to know. 
Secretary McNamara should immedi-
ately declassify all of the material in the 
staff report and in the Tonkin Gulf hear-
ing on August 6, 1964. Failing such ac-
tion on the part of the Secretary, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
should come before the Senate to declas-
sify the staff report. 
Meanwhile, events in South Vietnam 
attest to the utter futility of U.S. policies 
there. 
As the Wall Street Journal stated in its 
leading editorial on February 23, 1968: 
We• thlnk the American people should be 
getting ready to accept, l! they haven't al-
ready, the prospect that the whole Vietnam 
ell'ort may be doomed; it may be ta.J.I!ng apart 
beneath our !ect. 
take it he has discussed it with no Mem- Casualty figures published last week 
ber of this body. Certainly we have no show that more American fighting men 
information 1n the Committee on For- were k1lled in action during the preced-
eign Relations about these plans. 1ng week-543-tha.n in a.ny other week 
It would seem, in view of the disas- of the wa.r. In the 41 days that had 
trous situation 1n which we find our- ela.psed during 1968 when the report was 
selves, that the Committee on Foreign ma.de, 2,242 American fighting men have 
Relations and the Senate should be in- been killed in Vietnam. This is at a rate 
formed a.bout the President's plans be- of over 20,000 deaths a year. 
fore a decision is made. The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. 
14'r. MANSFIELD. I am sure a decision MoNTOYA in Ule chair). The Senator's 
will be made, and if and when it 1s time has expired. 
made, I am sure the Senate will be in- Mr. GRUENING. I ask unanimous con-
formed a.t that time. I have no d/ubt sent that I ma.y proceed for 10 additional 
that It will. minutes. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 
FALSEHOOD F" TT URE AND FUTIL- objection, it is so ordered. 
· ~ • Mr. GRUENING. The events o! the 
ITY-THE COLLAPSE OF U.S. POL- lnst 2 weeks have shown conclusively tha t 
ICY IN VIEI'NAM · the repeatedly optimistic reporl.i of Gen-
Mr. GROENING. Mr. President, the eral Westmoreland and other high &d-
events of the past few \\'eeks have dem- ministration officials are, aa they have 
onstra.ted ~and a shadow of a. doubt been for the past 4 years, ent1rely base-
the utter collapse of U.S. pollcy in South- less. 
east AsiA. Mllltarily the United Sta tes has l01: t 
Faets now coming to ]jght concerning 
the Tonkin Gulf episodes of August 2 and 
•. 19M, further widen the so-called credi-
blllty ga~ The able and distinguished 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relatioru 
Committee (Mr. FuLBRIGHT] has stated 
that Secretary McNamara's statement 
before that committee, as released by 
Secretary McNamara. is "a classic exam-
ple ot selective declasolflcation of security 
materiaL" 
He said further: 
J:verythlng related to the Tonkin lncldenta 
l.s •·secret" except that which the Pentagon 
deems should be made public. Th!B deceives 
the American public. 
I agree. 
I have read the so-C&lled top secret 
carefully compiled report af the statr of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Com.mJttee 
and the transcript of the hearing held 
before that committee on February 20. A 
review of both these documents makes It 
clear that Secretary McNamara did not 
tell the whole truth, either, when he testi-
fted before the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in August 1964 or when he testi-
fied before It on February of this year. 
the initiative. 
Those opposed to the Saigon regime 
have shown conclusively that there can 
be 80 wety in the streets af any South 
Vietnamese street, Including thoee of 
the nation's capital-Saigon. 
Meantime, we have permitted 5,000 
marines to become beselged tn the north 
in an area becoming i.n£reumgly inde-
fensible. 
And now the call has come !rom Gen-
eral Westmoreland in Saigon for more 
American troops. 
To what end? 
The time has cam&-
The New York Times stated 1n its lead-
ing editorial on February 25, 1968-
far Americans and their leaders to recog-
nize that the policy Itself 1a Illogical; that 1t 
entra.pe the United States in a war without 
v1a1ble lllnit.a, despite all omcJ&I. optlmiam; 
that 1t w1ll continue to make 1naaUable de-
mands on American mAnpower, reeourcea and 
energy tar beyond the worth ot any con-
ceivable gains. The only sound. policy Ia to 
move from the battletl.eld to the negotiating 
table wtth fullest speed. 
The much vaunted pacification pro-
gram to "win the hearts and minds" of 
the rural population has collapsed as the 
pacification teams have been drawn in to 
defend the very cities on which their owt:) 
security depended. 
In September, with a loud fanfare, the 
a-dministration, based on rigged electio1.s 
and the adoption of a high sounding con-
stitution, announced that democracy had 
come to South Vietnam. 
That so-called democracy there has 
been rapidly deteriorating the last few 
days. 
The constitution has been suspended. 
The corrupt military junta is jailing 
the leading opponents in the last elec-
tion-"protective custody" is what it is 
called, a term highly reminiscent of the 
same term used in Fascist and Commu-
nist countries. It is not surprising that 
such term is used in a country, one of the 
dominant figures of whom is General Ky, 
whose greatest hero is Adolph Hitler. 
lp. a moving advertisement in the New 
York Times on February 25, 1968, headed 
' 'In the Name o! God, Let's Stop It Now," 
inserted by the International Committee 
of Conscience on Vietnam of the Fellow-
ship of Reconcil1atlon pointed out that-
First. The Venerable Thlch Tri Quang, 
"widely revered South Vietnamese Bud-
dhist monk" has been placed in "protec-
tive custody"; 
Second. The peace candidates in the 
September elections, Au Truong Thanh 
and Truong D1nh Dzue, have been placed 
In' protective custody"; 
Third. Many of the 65 Sa.~on Univer-
sity professors who signed an appeal for 
a cease-fire and negotiations have been 
arrested and the others threatened with 
arrest; 
Fourth. Seventeen leaders of South 
Vietnamese student organizations have 
been arrested for appealing for a cease-
fire and negotiations; 
Fifth. The Roman Cathollc Bishops of 
South Vietnam have appealed to both 
sides for a cease-fire and the end of 
hootlllties and negotiations. 
Strict censorship of the press has been 
lmpo "'d in South Vietnam. 
As Flora Lewis, writing from ~on in 
the Washington Post states: 
The newspapers here are censored to a 
point that &Oinettmes leavea more w111te &pace 
than black. rn.ooura.gtng remarks are no' 
prln~ 
Thus the American etrorts to bring 
democracy to South vtetnam are re-
corded in falsehood, fa.1lu.re, and tuttli.ty. 
ONJI POIISDILJI IIOLU'rlON TO THJI VlJITNAK 
DILl!:MKA 
Recommendation8 for extrication of 
the United States from Its Vietnamese 
folly are not ihe respoosibillt,y of those 
who for ye&rS have dii!Sented from United 
States pollcy 1n Vietnam. It is the re-
sponsibility ~ thoee who got us Into the 
Southeast Asia mess. 
However, if President Johnson really 
wants to get the United States out of the 
morass In Vietnam, and save us from 
ever-mounting and ever-deepening dis-
aster and the 1ncretils1n& slaughter of the 
flower of our youth and of thousands o! 
Vietnamese noncombatants, his oppor-
tunity iB here and now. 
He could go on nationwide radio and 
television and. 1n effect, say to the Amer-
ican people: 
"Illy fellow cWzens, I have tried for 4 
years and my predecessors have tried for 
' 
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